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ABSTRACT 
 
Early in 2002, members of two Producer Organisations (POs), the North Sea Fishermen’s 
Organisation in Britain, and the Dutch Cooperative Producentenorganisatie Oost Nederland, 
realised that their quotas of plaice and sole were insufficient to last until the end of the quota 
period.  Vessels have in the order of 70-80% of their needs for sole but only 50-60% plaice.  
In response they voluntarily tied up their vessels periodically early in the year.  This was 
repeated in 2004 and 2005.     
 
The objective of this study, which was part-funded by the European Commission Directorate-
General for Fisheries and undertaken by the two POs and a firm of economists, was to 
identify whether the expected improved price stability for plaice and sole on the Urk auction 
market where most of the fish is sold, was achieved, and to estimate the amount of the 
improvement in revenues and cost-savings for the fleet.       
 
Inverse demand functions were calculated for lemon sole, dover sole, and plaice and the 
results suggest that revenue is maximised by spreading supplies evenly across any given time 
period. This was confirmed by simulations of the estimated model which were run to predict 
what would have been the revenue in the period that the tie up scheme was in force against an 
alternative scenario of the scheme not being in force.    The aggregate gains in earnings are 
calculated to have been up to 18%.     
 
From a sample of vessels' costs and earnings accounts statistical evidence emerged that the 
profitability was higher in the years when the tie-up scheme was in place, though no 
significant change in revenue and crew share was found.    While individually the evidence of 
the econometrics and statistical tests is not conclusive (and that of the statistical tests need not 
be attributable to the tie-up scheme), combined, the two pieces of evidence do suggest that the 
tie-up scheme did result in the intended higher revenues and profits, and a more stable market.   
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Introduction 
 
Early in 2002, members of the North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation (NSFO), in the 
United Kingdom, and of the Cooperative Producentenorganisatie Oost Nederland UA 
(CPO), in the Netherlands, realised that quotas of plaice and sole on their North Sea 
fishing grounds were insufficient to ensure a fishery until the end of the quota period and 
would be quickly exhausted.  In response to this realisation, NSFO members agreed 
voluntarily to tie up their vessels for one week in four during the first three months of the 
year.  Similarly, members of CPO limited their fishing to 40 days at sea during the first 
quarter, with at least 3 weeks without any fishing activity at all.  The action was repeated 
under the same principle but slightly different terms in 2004 and 2005 but not in 2003. 
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The membership of CPO is made up of beam trawlers fishing for flatfish in the North 
Sea.  They land almost exclusively to the markets at Urk and Harlingen.  CPO 
membership in 2004 consisted of more than 100 vessels of widely varying sizes.  The 
annual turnover of CPO members is approximately €115 million. 
 
The NSFO is a Producer Organisation (PO) with a membership of some 25 active 
vessels representing mainly British and Anglo-Dutch beam trawlers, most of which 
originate in the Dutch port of Urk.  Total income of the 23 North Sea beam trawlers in 
the NSFO, in 2004 was approximately €30 million.  A further 7 Urk beam trawlers with 
similar fishing patterns work within other UK Producer Organisations.  The Anglo-
Dutch vessels land mostly into the fish auction at Urk, or Harlingen, also in the 
Netherlands and the next most important market.   
 
The Dutch vessels operate under an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) management 
system where each fishing company originally had a quota given according to previous 
fishing practice and which could subsequently be traded.  Under the UK’s Fixed Quota 
Allocation (FQA) system each vessel has been allocated a share of the UK fish quotas 
also based on track record.  The vessel quotas are allocated to a vessel’s PO and 
administered by the PO.  It is effectively very similar to an ITQ system since quota may 
be, and is, traded, both between PO members and between POs. 
 
The average British North Sea beam trawler has access to significantly more annual 
plaice quota than average Dutch flagged vessels (approximately 400 tonnes  compared to 
175), and significantly less sole quota (15 tonnes compared to 50), leading to different 
fishing patterns evolving between what are physically very similar vessels.   
 
Vessels each had (and still have) significantly less quota of sole and plaice than they 
are capable of catching; they have in the order of 70-80% of their needs for sole but 
only 50-60% of the plaice they could catch.1   
 
The fish action at Urk is the leading fish auction in the Netherlands, taking a third of all 
Dutch sales, with a throughput of 35,500 tonnes in 2004.   
 
 
Problems of Estimation 
 
Early work in estimating the relationship between the quantity of fish supplied and the 
price achieved at fish auctions concentrated on the market for fish in the USA, where 
Bell (1968), Nash and Bell (1969), and Waugh and Norton (1969) established the 
empirically the inverse linkage between the price obtained for fish and the quantity 
landed.   
                                                 
1 This should not be taken as evidence, per se, of over-capacity in the fleets and even 
less a measure of it.  It is perfectly normal for an industry to work at less than full 
capacity.  Operating at 35% less than full capacity is not at all uncommon in other 
industries and since these fleets both exist under efficient management regimes 
historic overcapacity is being shed and they can be expected to be approaching an 
industry optimum by economic means.  That having been said, it is equally clear that 
the sharp falls in quota of recent years have left fleets needing a better quota to use 
their capital efficiently. 
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Gates (1974) confirmed the relationship and showed the importance of including the 
size of fish as an explanatory variable in the inverse demand function.   
 
In Europe, a number of studies since Ioannidis and Whitmarsh (1987) estimated the 
demand relationship for plaice in the United Kingdom and found the market to be 
highly competitive.  They supplied a theoretical underpinning for assuming that the 
supply of fisheries products at the quayside is indeed perfectly inelastic and that the 
demand function is therefore identified.  A conclusion of their study was that the 
direction of causality ran from quantity to price, confirming that the supply of fish is 
exogenous in the short-run.   
 
 
Cointegration of Price and Quantity 
 
Several papers have now established that fish prices and quantities sold at auction are 
often cointegrated.  Ioannidis and Matthews (1995) showed that the prices and 
quantities of both cod and haddock in the British market were cointegrated and 
proceeded to estimate demand functions for those species accordingly.   
 
However, the time period covered by the data is too short for the impact of shocks of 
the significance of, for example, 1970 oil prices, to be identified.  Since these types of 
shock were intended to be accommodated by analysis for co-integration and the use of 
error correction mechanisms, there is no justification for pursuing this approach and 
testing and correction for co-integration has not been carried out. 
 
 
Integration of Markets 
 
The American estimates of price elasticities are consistently lower than those 
estimated for the European market until the most recent.  Stigler (1969) established 
the Law of One Price and Nielsen has shown that to ignore the Law of One Price may 
invite estimates of price elasticity of demand which are excessive (Nielsen 1999).   
 
Thus the continental differences may be due to the fact that whereas both the 
American and European markets are each single integrated markets, empirical work 
has often treated the USA as a single market but European Union member states as a 
set of independent markets.   
 
Neilsen (1999) is especially valuable in that not only does he show the importance of 
market integration, he also offers a simple method for correcting estimates made 
where an apparent market is in reality part of a sub-market.   
 
Guillotreau et al (1998) concluded that the markets are integrated for roundfish in 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and United Kingdom. 
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Econometric Investigation of the Tie Up Scheme using the Inverse Demand 
Function  
 
The data used cover the quantities and values of sales of plaice and sole at Urk on a daily 
basis.  Data on daily landings and the prices achieved at Urk have been provided by 
Visafslag Urk – the Urk fish auction market.  They include landings and revenues 
achieved for lemon sole, dover sole, and plaice by EU market size category (Council 
Regulation 2406/96) from 1st January 2002 to 31st March 2004, a total of 584 
observations.  Sales were also disaggregated by nationality of the vessel landing the 
fish; namely, Belgian, Danish, German, Irish, Dutch, Norwegian, and British. 
 
Since this covers two periods when a collective agreement to tie-up was in force, the 
data proved adequate for the needs of the study.  The data were not corrected for 
inflation.  Obtaining an index for daily inflation is impossible, and to interpolate rates on 
inflation on a daily basis between monthly statistics would risk introducing more errors 
than it removed.  The time period covered is short and inflation has not been a serious 
problem in the Netherlands. 
 
The inverted demand curve for each of the three species confirmed the expected 
downward gradient of the curve in establishing the market price.  However, tests on 
the data suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity, and outliers.   
 
It became clear early on that the market has no memory.  There are no lagged 
variables influencing the prices determined.  This confirmed the belief that the use of 
a method which corrected for co-integration would have been inappropriate.  The use 
of lagged dependent variables to represent seasonality on a weekly and monthly basis 
was not possible as days when there were no sales disrupt the series.  Therefore 
dummy variables were used instead but they offered no indication of seasonality in 
prices for any of the three species and although they gave a markedly improved 
coefficient of correlation corrected for degrees of freedom, the temptation to accept 
them in preference to a model showing the cross-elasticities was resisted.  
 
Functions of the form 
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were estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), where the P are the 
prices of the species, f=1 to F, the Q are the quantities offered for sale.  The estimated 
equations for the three species are set out in Tables 4.2a-c. 
 
Table 3a: Estimated inverse demand function for lemon sole 
 
Lemon Sole Parameter Estimate t-Statistic and Significance 
Constant Term   9.0590  
Lemon Sole Own-Quantity -0.9584 22.38** 
Dover Sole Cross-Quantity -0.0967  2.94** 
R-bar-squared 0.763  
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Table 3b: Estimated inverse demand function for dover sole 
 
Dover Sole Parameter Estimate t-Statistic and Significance 
Constant Term   9.2750  
Dover Sole Own-Quantity -0.4586 16.70** 
Plaice Cross-Quantity -0.2426  9.79** 
R-bar-squared 0.845  
 
Table 3c: Estimated inverse demand function for plaice 
 
Plaice Parameter Estimate t-Statistic and Significance 
Constant Term   8.3960  
Plaice Own-Quantity -0.6998 52.37** 
2
R  0.826  
 
** indicates significant at the 1% level. 
 
The explanatory power of the estimates indicated by the
2
R is good, higher than is 
often the case for landings of fish.  This is believed to be due to the quality of the data 
provided by Visafslag Urk and the fact that the data relate to auctions of fish through 
the market.  There are no official statistics from any of the six countries whose vessels 
sold their catch through Urk which might have been corrupted by misreporting.  The 
mean size variables did not prove significant. 
 
 
The Simulation Tests 
 
The next stage was to compare, by simulation, what the model calculates were the 
earnings with the tie-up scheme in place to what it suggests would have been the 
earnings if it had not been.  (It is necessary to let the model estimate the earnings 
under the scenarios of the tie up scheme being in place and not in place in order to be 
able to compare like-for-like when it is asked to estimate an alternative scenario.) 
 
The alternative scenario chosen for this study has been to assume that the monthly 
sales of fish through the market by British and Dutch vessels in each month of the tie-
up scheme’s operation would have been put through in the first three weeks of each 
month.  This was achieved by raising the level of actual landings proportionately.  
Supplies from other countries through the market were left unchanged. 
 
Table 4: Aggregate Gains in Earnings Arising from the Tie-Up Scheme 
 
CPO NSFO 
2002 16% 15% 
2004 12% 18% 
 
The prices for each of the three species estimated by the model both with and without 
the tie-up scheme in place are set out in Figure 5a-c. 
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Figure 5a: Estimated prices of lemon sole with and without the tie-up scheme 
operating 
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Figure 5b: Estimated prices of dover sole with and without the tie-up scheme 
operating 
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Figure 5c: Estimated prices of plaice with and without the tie-up scheme operating 
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In the case of all three species examined, it can be seen that prices are more volatile 
when the tie up scheme was not operating. 
 
 
Statistical Analysis of the Impact of the Tie-Up Scheme using Costs, and 
Earnings Data 
 
To confirm whether profitability might have improved as a result of the scheme, it 
was decided to assemble costs and earnings data for a sample of vessels and to test 
whether a number of variables were significantly different when the scheme was in 
operation.  The variables tested were revenue, costs, profits, profits as a percentage of 
revenue, crew share, and crew share as a percentage of revenue 
 
Costs and earnings data were obtained for a sample of nine vessels for the years 1999 
to 2003, the latest available.  Eight vessels were members of CPO and the ninth a 
member of NSFO, all fishing from Urk.  In 1999 one vessel was omitted because of 
missing data and in 2002 one set of observations was omitted as the vessel was 
replaced and there had clearly been an unusual impact on the costs and earnings for 
the year.  Thus in the period 1999 to 2001 and 2003 there was a total sample of 35 
observations and in 2002, the year when the tie-up scheme was in place, a sample of 8 
observations. 
 
The data were adjusted to correct for inflation using the EU Harmonised annual 
average consumer price index.  One-tailed t-tests under the assumption that the 
variances were unequal were conducted on the means of the sample statistics, 
revenue, profits and profits as a percentage of revenue.   
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The alternative hypothesis, H1, was that each was significantly higher at the 5% level 
in 2002 when the tie-up scheme was in place than in the remainder of the period 1999 
to 2003 when it was not.  The results are set out in Appendix 2. 
 
For revenue, the t-statistic is not significant and we cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
H0, that there is no difference between the revenue obtained in 2002 when the tie-up 
scheme was in force and in the other years.   
 
This is not in conflict with the findings of the econometrics which estimated the 
impact on revenue had the tie-up scheme not been in force.  Combined the two 
different methods of analysis suggest that if the tie-up scheme had not been in force in 
2002 the level of revenue would have been noticeably lower than usual.  This concurs 
with the impact of the bad weather experienced. 
 
While the primary effect of the tie up scheme was expected to be on the stability of 
prices, a secondary effect may have occurred on the costs of the fleet.  The impact 
could have been that the congestion cost experienced by the fleet was lowered.  The 
tests suggest that costs although they were on average 12% lower in 2002 could not 
be considered statistically to be significantly below normal. 
 
Profits are a sharper test as they represent the difference between the revenue and 
costs and are thus more volatile in the face of commercial pressures and, indeed, the t-
test of profits confirms that the null hypothesis, that the level of profit in 2002 was the 
same as in other years, can be rejected.  The evidence is quite strong with a likelihood 
of only about 1 in 30 of being incorrect.  A similar result was obtained for profits as a 
percentage of revenue. 
 
It should be noted that it does not necessarily follow that the finding, of significantly 
higher profits during the year in which the tie-up scheme was in place, was brought 
about by the tie-up scheme itself.  However, we are not readily able to offer any 
coincidental cause.   
 
A possibility might have been abundant stocks but neither plaice nor sole stocks were 
out of the 1999 to 2003 range in 2002, as shown in Figure 5.1.  There was however, a 
slight upward trend in stocks of plaice, but no discernible trend in the biomass of sole. 
 
It is possible that the bad weather in late 2002 had more influence in holding up prices 
but plaice and sole have not been reported as having elasticities which would increase 
revenue as a result of generally lower landings.  The evidence from the econometrics 
is that improved stability of prices resulting from smoother landings has made the 
difference. 
 
While these results suggest that profits were higher in 2002 than the other years 
tested, they do appear to support the view that the Dutch fleet was prevented from 
taking its quota owing to bad weather in the later part of the year.  This conclusion is 
supported by the observation that revenue to the fleets was not found to be higher 
during 2002. 
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Discussion and Inferences 
 
The results found by the econometric testing corroborate the work of earlier studies 
that have found an inverse relationship between the amount of sole and plaice 
available and the prices achieved at auction.  They also verify the finding that the 
price of both is fairly elastic but relatively low.   
 
The value of the elasticities estimated and the subsequent simulation of an alternative 
landings pattern indicate that the fleet did indeed benefit from the collective restraint 
in supplying fish to the market in a more orderly fashion than might otherwise have 
occurred.   However, there are some weaknesses indicated by the statistical tests of 
the data.  It was disappointing that a relationship between the price achieved and the 
average size of fish being offered for sale was not found, and likewise that there 
appears to be no seasonal influence on prices at either a daily or monthly level. 
 
The statistical test on the costs and earnings data also indicate some benefit from the 
collective action to smooth the pattern of landings.  While the tests give quite a strong 
indication that profits in the year of the tie-up scheme were better than they would 
have been in a free-for-all, the question of causation is not proven. 
 
Individually the evidence of the econometrics and statistical tests is not strong.  
Indeed, that of the statistical tests need not necessarily be attributable to the tie-up 
scheme at all.  However, combined, the two pieces of evidence do suggest that the tie-
up scheme did result in higher revenues and profits than would have been available to 
the fleets if the vessels had not collaborated in the tie-up scheme. 
 
Nevertheless, despite some statistical problems with the data, it is the conclusion of 
this study that the collective behaviour of the two fleets of beam trawlers belonging to 
CPO and NSFO members did achieve the objective of making gains from more stable 
markets, and that the processors, caterers, retailers and consumers of flatfish will have 
benefited accordingly. 
 
The collective behaviour of the beam trawl fleets is unusual in fisheries and has wider 
implications.  Beam trawler owners have often been accused of being among the least 
responsible of fishing enterprises.  This study suggests that if a good case can be made 
to them they are capable of leading the way if necessary towards responsible fishing. 
 
There is a further inference that can be drawn that is of some importance throughout 
the fishing industry in Europe.  This study suggests that in many fish markets, fleets 
could improve their own incomes by collective behaviour to stabilise markets through 
providing a steady supply rather than by racing to fish and then racing to the auction.   
 
In many industries such collective behaviour might prove detrimental to the interests 
of the consumer, but in the particular circumstances in which fisheries are to be found 
operating, it appears to offer benefits to the fleets, processors, caterers, retailers and 
consumers alike, with no-one losing. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Results of Econometric Estimation of Inverse Demand Functions 
 
Method of Estimation: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Number of Observations 584 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic 
Constant Lemon Sole 9.059 0.1319 68.69** 
Own-Quantity of Lemon Sole        -0.9584 0.0428 -22.38** 
Cross-Quantity of Dover Sole -0.0967 0.0329 -2.942** 
Constant Dover Sole 9.275 0.1015 91.43** 
Own-Quantity of Dover Sole        -0.4586 0.0275 -16.70** 
Cross-Quantity of Plaice      -0.2426 0.0248 -9.798** 
Constant Plaice 8.396 0.1210 69.37** 
Own-Quantity of Plaice -0.6998 0.0134 -52.37** 
 
 
 Inverse Demand 
Function for 
Lemon Sole 
Inverse Demand 
Function for 
Dover Sole 
Inverse Demand 
Function for 
Plaice 
Mean of dependent variable 4.415 4.984 3.221 
Standard deviation of 
dependent variable 
4.184 3.565 4.054 
Sum of squared residuals 2430 1146 1671 
Variance of residuals 4.161 1.963 2.862 
Standard error of regression 2.040 1.401 1.692 
2R  0.7631 0.8453 0.8262 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.783 1.937 1.948 
 
 
Simulation Results 
 
Year  Free for All 
Tie-Up Scheme in 
Place 
Tie-Up Scheme 
in Place versus 
Free for All as a 
percentage 
Dutch Vessels 2901421 3375695 1.163 
2002 
British Vessels 1084602 1255004 1.157 
Dutch Vessels 3317044 3719132 1.121 
2004 
British Vessels 1270983 1511537 1.189 
IIFET 2006 Portsmouth Proceedings 
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Appendix 2 
 
Results of the Statistical Testing of Data for 2002 when the Tie-Up Scheme was in force compared to 1999 to 2001 and 2003 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances     
  Revenue Costs Profits 
Profits as a 
Percentage of 
Revenue 
Crew Share 
Crew Share as 
a Percentage 
of Revenue 
Mean 1,403,061 1,028,528 374,533 27.40 266,818 18.96
Variance 145,454,953,338 132,754,451,018 34,476,508,440 202.05 10,359,091,848 23.72Variable 1 
Observations 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mean 1,401,958 1,173,958 228,000 16.23 276,311 19.76
Variance 101,115,525,596 92,061,090,481 28,927,148,888 123.41 9,098,670,232 31.09Variable 2 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35
Variable 1 / Variable 2 1.001 0.876 1.643 1.689 0.966 0.959
Hypothesised Mean Difference 0 0 0 0 0 0
Degrees of Freedom 9 9 10 9 10 12
t Statistic 0.008 -1.049 2.045 2.083 -0.241 -0.410
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.497 0.161 0.034 0.033 0.407 0.345
t Critical one-tail 1.833 1.833 1.812 1.833 1.812 1.782
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.994 0.322 0.068 0.067 0.815 0.689
t Critical two-tail 2.262 2.262 2.228 2.262 2.228 2.179
 
 
